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Abstract. This paper develops a positive analysis of alliance formation,
building on a simple economic model that features a \winner-take-all" con-
test for control of some resource. When an alliance forms, members pool
their e®orts in that contest and, if successful, apply the resource to a joint
production process. Due to the familiar free-rider problem, the formation
of alliances tends to reduce the severity of the con°ict over the contestable
resource. Despite the con°ict that arises among the winning alliance's mem-
bers over the distribution of their joint product, under reasonable conditions
this e®ect alone is su±cient to support stable alliance formation in a non-
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Conventional economic analyses of the allocation of resources among var-
ious productive uses and the distribution of the product generated from
those uses take as given the existence of well-de¯ned and costlessly enforced
property rights. The emerging literature on con°ict and predation, however,
shows that allowing for the possibility of con°ict in economic interactions
can have profound implications for the distribution of resources.1 But, that
literature seems somewhat incomplete in that it abstracts from the possibil-
ity that alliances form.2
This paper develops a positive analysis of alliance formation. The anal-
ysis is based on a simple economic model that features a \winner-take-all"
contest for control of some resource|for example, territory. Without the for-
mation of alliances, each individual exerts some e®ort to secure the resource,
which in turn is applied to the production of a homogeneous consumption
good. By contrast, when an alliance forms, members pool their e®orts in
that contest. If successful, the members in turn apply the resource to a joint
production process.
Moving beyond the traditional theory of alliances that follows the pi-
oneering work of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966),3 the present analysis does
not take the membership of alliances as given. Nor is there any presumption
that peace prevails among members of an alliance. Rather, the distribution
of the output from joint production is subject to another, separate con°ict|
that is, between the members of the alliance. The analysis shows that, just
as the possible emergence of con°ict between individuals in their economic
interactions can have important implications for the equilibrium distribu-
tion of resources and income, the possibility of con°ict between individuals
within an alliance should not be ignored.4
1See, for example, Hirshleifer (1991, 1995), Skaperdas (1992) and Grossman and Kim
(1995). Gar¯nkel and Skaperdas (2000) provide a brief overview.
2Two notable exceptions|Skaperdas (1998) and Noh (2002)|are discussed below.
3For a survey of this literature, including applied work, see Sandler and Hartley (2001).
4The literature on collective rent seeking|see, for example, Nitzan (1991)|similarly
considers settings in which there are two levels of con°ict: that which emerges between
groups and that which emerges within a group. But, most of the analyses in this literature
e®ectively treat the two levels of con°ict as one. For given each group's pre-determined
sharing rule, each member's contribution to his respective group's e®ort in the inter-group
con°ict jointly determines the outcome of both that con°ict and the intra-group con°ict.
1Nevertheless, borrowing from this traditional theory, one might naturally
look to the public-good nature of defense and appropriative e®orts to explain
the emergence of alliances|for example, the cost-saving advantages realized
when neighboring nations take defensive measures against a common enemy
[Sandler (1999)].5 Skaperdas (1998) and Noh (2002) show in di®erent though
related settings that a con°ict technology having this sort of property is, in
fact, critical for the emergence of an alliance.
The analysis of the present paper suggests, however, that such a tech-
nology might not even be necessary. A potential bene¯t of the formation
of alliances, captured in neither Skaperdas (1998) nor Noh (2002), derives
from the presence of the free-rider problem. Speci¯cally, the incentive for
each member of the alliance to contribute to the group's collective e®ort in
securing the contestable resource is reduced by the alliance's size, since the
bene¯t possibly realized would have to be shared with the other members,
whereas the cost is borne privately by the individual member.6 Hence, the
con°ict directly over the contestable resource is reduced. Of course, a new
con°ict arises with the formation of alliances, and as already suggested ad-
ditional resources must be expended by each member of the winning alliance
to secure her share of the alliance's product. Nonetheless, relative to the
case of individual con°ict, the formation of alliances tends to reduce the
overall severity of con°ict.7
By contrast, the present analysis treats the resolution of the con°ict within the alliance
as distinct from that between alliances, and more importantly assumes no mechanism by
which members of an alliance can commit to a sharing rule. [Katz and Tokatlidu (1996)
and WÄ arneryd (1998) have a similar structure.]
5Also see Sandler (1993) who surveys the previous literature on the public-good nature
of an alliance's defense. Alesina and Spolaore (2000) recently consider the importance
of international con°ict in the equilibrium determination of the size and number of the
nation-states, suggesting in their concluding remarks that the nation-state might be in-
terpreted as an alliance. However, like the traditional theory of alliances, they presume
that peace prevails among members of the nation-state.
6In Skaperdas (1998), the outcome of each con°ict is determined by the parties' relative
strategic endowments, which are given exogenously. In Noh (2002), the free-rider problem
does not arise, simply because the cost of each member's contribution to the alliance's
collective e®ort is borne by the entire alliance. For that part of the individual's inalienable
endowment which is not used in the collective e®ort to secure the contestable resource is
used in joint production. The alliance's output, in turn, is distributed equally to the
members|i.e., according to the ex ante optimally chosen sharing rule.
7WÄ arneryd (1998) ¯rst suggested such an e®ect in his explanation of the emergence of
a federalist structure of jurisdictional interaction. The analysis of the present paper goes
beyond this novel idea towards the endogenous determination of the number and size of
2An application of the theory of endogenous coalition structures|in the
spirit of, for example, Bloch (1996), Chwe (1994), Ray and Vohra (1997,
1999), and Yi (1997)|shows that this negative net e®ect on the severity of
con°ict alone generally is su±cient to support the formation of alliances in a
noncooperative equilibrium. Now, when the the total number of individuals
is very small, there is virtually no room to di®use the inter-alliance con°ict,
whereby the structure can be made incentive compatible. However, when
the number of individuals involved is su±ciently large, there exists at least
one stable multi-member alliance structure, and beyond that multiple con¯g-
urations are possible. In such cases, while the expected gains under alliance
formation summed across all individuals might be larger when alliances are
not of the same size as has been suggested by Katz and Tokatlidu (1996),
they need not be. The overriding determinant, given the total number of
individuals involved, is instead the number of alliances.8 Speci¯cally, the
analysis ¯nds that the expected gains from alliance formation in the aggre-
gate relative to individual con°ict are greater when the number of alliances
is larger and the alliances are smaller in size.9
In what follows, the next section presents the model of con°ict which al-
lows for the formation of multi-member alliances. Section 3 establishes the
benchmark case of individual con°ict. Then, treating the pre-con°ict deter-
mination of the structure of alliances as given, section 4 characterizes the
allocation of resources and payo®s generally and, in the case of a symmet-
ric alliance structure, illustrates the bene¯t of alliance formation to reduce
the severity of con°ict. Section 5 then studies the endogenous formation of
alliances, characterizing stable alliance structures and their welfare implica-
tions. Finally, section 6 o®ers some concluding remarks, including a brief
discussion of possible extensions of the analysis.
the alliances in con°ict.
8To be sure, Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) take the number of groups (2) as given, and
study the implications of asymmetric group size.
9By contrast, Baik and Lee (2001), who similarly study the endogenous determination
of the number and sizes of groups, tend to predict the emergence of just one alliance. As
discussed below, the di®erence in these predictions can be attributed, in large part, to
the fact that, in their analysis, like that of Noh (2002), the \prize" from the inter-alliance
contest is distributed to alliance members according to a pre-committed rule. While
clouding the distinction between the inter-alliance con°ict and the intra-alliance con°ict,
this distribution mechanism presumes an element of cooperation within the alliance.
32 Analytical framework
Consider an environment populated by N identical, risk-neutral individuals,
I = f1;2;:::;Ng, who participate in a three-stage game. In the ¯rst stage,
agents i 2 I form alliances. An alliance is de¯ned as any subset of the
population, Ak µ I, with membership nk ¸ 1, where k = 1;2;:::;A and A
denotes the total number of alliances. For future reference, let the alliance
structure be indicated by S = fn1;n2;:::;nAg, with the alliances ordered
such that n1 ¸ n2 ¸ n3 ¢¢¢ ¸ nA. By de¯nition, all individuals belong to
an alliance. However, an alliance need not include more than one mem-
ber. Moreover, this framework admits the possibility that everyone comes
together to form a single alliance|the grand alliance: A1 = f1;2;:::;Ng.
2.1 Stage 2: con°ict between alliances
In the second stage, all individuals participate in a winner-take-all con-
°ict/contest over a resource X, which is necessary for the production of a
homogeneous consumption good in the third stage. They participate either
collectively with others or alone, as dictated by the alliance structure deter-
mined in stage one. For any given con¯guration of alliances, each member
i 2 Ak chooses how much she will contribute to the alliance's appropriative
e®ort, mi.10 The probability that alliance k wins the con°ict and success-













i2Aj mi > 0; otherwise, ¹k = 1=A for all k.11
By assumption here, members of any alliance k with nk > 1 have no
special advantage over those individuals who choose to participate in the
10Since production is not possible until the resource is secured, the cost of this e®ort,
as speci¯ed below, can be interpreted as foregone leisure.
11This speci¯cation, ¯rst introduced by Tullock (1980) for individual rent seeking, is
the contest success function most commonly used in the con°ict/contest, rent-seeking lit-
erature. As argued below, although it admits the possibility of a corner solution for all
members of all alliances, such a solution is not a possible equilibrium outcome. See Hirsh-
leifer (1989) who discusses the properties of this speci¯cation and related ones. Note that,
under the maintained assumption of risk-neutrality, an alliance's probability of winning
and taking the entire prize X, ¹k, may be interpreted alternatively as its resource share.
4con°ict on their own.12 Nevertheless, this formulation captures one aspect
of the public-good nature of defense spending. In particular, appropriative
e®orts by di®erent members of a given alliance are perfect substitutes for
one another. Regardless of who provides any additional e®ort, all members
enjoy the increased probability of securing the resource X it implies.
2.2 Stage 3: joint production and con°ict within the alliance
To ¯x ideas suppose that alliance k, with nk > 1, successfully captures the
resource X. Individuals not belonging to that alliance, i 2 Ak0 where k0 6= k,
receive nothing, implying that their second-stage e®orts result only in a loss,
uik0 = ¡mi, over the three stages.
Turning to the members i of the winning alliance k, each i 2 Ak is
identically endowed with a unit of labor, which she allocates to productive
activities, li, and appropriative or security related activities, si, subject to
1 = li + si: (2)
These activities along with X, in turn, deliver goods for consumption at
the end of the stage. Speci¯cally, individuals i 2 Ak collectively combine
the resource X with a fraction of their labor endowment, li = 1 ¡ si in a
joint (linear) production process to yield a homogeneous consumption good.




i2Ak[1 ¡ si]X=nk: (3)
Although X might be considered a public good from the perspective of the
second-stage (winner-take-all) con°ict, at this stage X would be interpreted
as a purely private good.13










With N = 3, he ¯nds that a stable alliance between two of the three agents is possible only
when ° > 1 (i.e., under super-additivity). Noh (2002) obtains a similar result assuming a
slightly di®erent speci¯cation to capture the advantage that multi-member alliances have
in con°ict.
13Specifying production as a joint process is common in the economics literature on
con°ict. [See, for example, the survey by Gar¯nkel and Skaperdas (2000).] Allowing for
5For nk > 1, each member must also devote a strictly positive e®ort,
si > 0, towards securing a share of the ¯nal product. This latter activity,
re°ecting the con°ict that emerges within the winning alliance, detracts
from production. Assume that the share of ¯nal output, Yk, enjoyed by
agent i 2 Ak, ¾ik, depends on her security e®ort si, distinct from mi, and
on the e®ort by everyone else in her alliance, sj for j 6= i 2 Ak. More







j2Ak sj > 0; otherwise ¾ik = 1=nk for all i 2 Ak. Each member i 2 Ak,
then, obtains a payo® given by uik = ¾ikYk ¡ mi. Whether her alliance
secures the resource or not, each individual alone bears the cost of the con-
tribution she makes to her alliance's e®ort in the second-stage con°ict. Even
if there were no con°ict within the winning alliance so that si = 0 for all
i 2 Ak and ¾ik = 1=nk, the free-rider problem would be relevant.
But, the analysis does not assume that \peace" prevails among the al-
liance members. That is, while involved in a joint production process in the
third stage, individuals must worry about the eventual distribution of the
alliance's product. Following Grossman (2001), one can think of the mem-
bers' security or guarding e®orts which determine this distribution, si, as
a process by which e®ective property rights are created and output jointly
produced is shared. That some additional resources are required by each in-
dividual to secure a share of the ¯nal output makes alliances less appealing.
Indeed, in supposing that some e®ort is required in the production process
and in securing a share of the ¯nal output, the analysis of the third stage of
this model captures the fundamental trade-o® between production and ap-
propriation highlighted in Haavelmo (1954, pp. 91-98) and considered more
recently in, for example, Hirshleifer, (1988), Gar¯nkel (1990), Skaperdas
(1992), and Grossman and Kim (1995).14
complementarities or increasing returns in production would provide another potential
bene¯t of group formation. However, given the linear homogeneity of the technology as
speci¯ed here, one need not suppose that there is any sort of interaction between alliance
members in production. An alternative interpretation of the production technology (3) is
that each member of the winning alliance takes an equal share of X at the beginning of
the third stage and produces in isolation of the others. In this case, the share ¾ik, de¯ned
below in (4), would represent the fraction of her own product that member i defends and
that which she captures from the other members of her alliance k.
14That such a trade-o® does not emerge in the second stage might appear to be im-
63 Individual con°ict
Before moving on to the analysis of the equilibrium allocation of resources
given the alliance structure, consider the case of individual con°ict. Speci¯-
cally, suppose that each alliance has only one member: A = N and S = ¹ S ´
f1;:::;1g. In this case with con°ict over X only, each individual i (or al-
liance k) chooses mi to maximize her expected payo®, equal to her expected
consumption in the third stage net of the cost of her e®ort in securing the
contestable resource in the second stage, or ue
i = ¹iX ¡mi, subject to (1).15
Assume everyone makes this choice simultaneously.
The speci¯cation for the contest success function (1) generally implies
that, if no appropriative e®ort were made by anyone, then any individual
could capture the contestable resource with near certainty by putting forth
an in¯nitesimally small amount of e®ort. Since no one would leave such an
opportunity unexploited, the \peaceful" outcome where mi = 0 for all i 2 I
cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, each individual's optimizing choice of mi
satis¯es the ¯rst-order condition, [M ¡ mi]X = M2, where M =
P
j2I mj,
implying the unique, symmetric Nash equilibrium:
¹ m ´ m(1; ¹ S) = (N ¡ 1)X=N2 (5a)
¹ ue ´ ue(1; ¹ S) = X=N2 > 0 (5b)
for i 2 I. As shown in (5b), each individual's expected payo® is strictly pos-
itive, increasing in the amount of the contested resource, X, but decreasing
in the total number of people competing for that resource, N. We will refer
back to this outcome later as it provides a benchmark against which the
gains of multi-member alliance formation can be measured.
portant for the central results of the analysis. What is important here, however, is that
individuals do not fully internalize the bene¯ts of their e®orts in ¯ghting over X relative
to the costs they incur. In particular, the ¯ndings of this analysis would follow if it were
alternatively based on a framework that is more in line with the collective rent-seeking
literature such as that in Noh (2002), provided that individuals also valued leisure. By
the same token, the qualitative results would remain the same if the analysis were based
on a model in which there was no production in the third stage, as in Katz and Tokatlidu
(1996) and WÄ arneryd (1998).
15This cost is expressed in the equivalent units of expected consumption. Since nk = 1,
equation (4) implies, independent of the rest of the alliance structure, that si = ¹ s(1) = 0
and ¾ik = 1. Then, equation (3) implies that ¾ikYk = X.
74 The allocation of resources and expected payo®s given the
alliance structure
Treating the pre-con°ict determination of the alliance structure S as given,
the analysis now considers the allocation of resources in the second and third
stages. Each individual aims to maximize her expected payo® which equals,
as in the case of individual con°ict, her expected consumption in the third
stage net of the cost of her e®ort in securing the contestable resource in
the second stage expressed in the equivalent units of expected consumption:
ue
ik = ¹k¾ikYk ¡mi. In this dynamic setting, the amount of resources avail-
able to anyone in the third stage will, of course, depend on second-stage
choices. All individuals, when making their second-stage choices, will take
this in°uence into account. In accordance with the equilibrium notion of
subgame perfection, then, we solve the model backwards, starting with the
third and ¯nal stage.
4.1 The outcome of the intra-alliance con°ict
Given the outcome of the second-stage con°ict over X and mi, equations
(3) and (4) imply that the payo® to each member i of the winning alliance











Each individual i 2 Ak chooses si to maximize this expression. Assume that
alliance members make their third-stage choices simultaneously.
The con°ict technology shown in (4) precludes the \peaceful" outcome
where si = 0 for all i 2 Ak and nk > 1.16 As such, the following condition









with strict equality for si < 1. Not surprisingly given the symmetry of
the alliance's membership, this condition implies that members choose the
16The reasoning here is analogous to that sketched above with respect to the con°ict
technology shown in (1) [see section 3].
8same labor allocation, si = s and, at the same time, an interior optimum:
si 2 (0;1) for all i 2 Ak.17 Using equations (3), (4) and (6), condition (7) as
a strict equality implies the following Nash equilibrium of the third stage:
si = (nk ¡ 1)=nk; (8a)
uik = X=n2
k ¡ mi (8b)
for all i 2 Ak. In this equilibrium, each member of the winning alliance
enjoys an equal share of ¯nal output: ¾ik = 1=nk, which is decreasing in
the size of the alliance.18 But, given mi, because a larger nk implies a
greater dilution of the prize X and a greater diversion of e®ort away from
production towards security, the payo® is decreasing in the square of the
size of the alliance.
4.2 The outcome of the inter-alliance con°ict
Now consider the second-stage con°ict between alliances, again with the
alliance structure ¯xed. Each individual i belonging to alliance k chooses
mi to maximize the expected value of (8b), given by
ue
ik = ¹kX=n2
k ¡ mi; (9)
subject to the con°ict technology, ¹k, as speci¯ed in (1). Individuals in all
A alliances make their decisions simultaneously. In (9), the ¯rst term repre-
sents the product enjoyed by member i of alliance k, having won the con°ict,
weighted by the winning probability, ¹k. The second term represents the
utility cost of ¯ghting over the contestable resource expressed in equivalent
units of expected consumption; it is borne solely by the individual regardless
of the outcome of that con°ict.




i2Aj mi > 0, a fully interior solution is not guaranteed for all con-
¯gurations of alliances when A > 2. That is to say, the members of one or
more alliances might choose mi = 0. But, the stability of a given con¯gura-
17Note, in particular, that if si = 1 held for some i, then it would have to hold for all
i 2 Ak. But then the alliance's total output (Yk) and thus the left hand side of (7) would
be equal to zero, yielding a self-contradiction.
18Of course, as indicated earlier, the speci¯cation for the con°ict resolution technology
(4) implies that for i 2 Ak, where nk = 1, si = ¹ s = 0.
9tion does require that all alliances actively participate in the second-stage
con°ict.19 In anticipation of our subsequent focus on stable alliances and
in the interest of brevity, the analysis to follow considers only such solu-














Maintaining focus on the case of within-alliance symmetry (i.e., when mi












j=1 njmj.20 With this condition, one can ¯nd the equilibrium
e®ort put forth by each individual belonging to alliance k of size nk, given
the alliance structure, S:







j for all k.21
In the case where all alliances are of equal size n ¸ 1, S ´ ^ S =
fn;:::;ng,22 the solution shown in (12) simpli¯es to ^ m ´ m(n; ^ S) = (N ¡
n)X=N2n2. Under individual con°ict where S = ^ S = ¹ S, this solution sim-
pli¯es even further to ¹ m ´ m(1; ¹ S) shown in (5a). By contrast, when the
grand alliance forms n = N, m(n; ^ S) = 0. As can easily be con¯rmed, un-
der alternative symmetric structures given N(= An), 1 · n · N, m(n; ^ S)
is decreasing in n or equivalently increasing in A.
19See Lemma 2 in Appendix A.1.
20Note, however, since the probability of winning X depends on
P
i2Ak mi, not just
mi, only total e®ort by the group is uniquely determined; individual e®ort, mi, is not.
Although the focus here on the symmetric outcome may make the emergence of alliances
more likely, this focus seems most natural given the assumption that individual members
of the alliance are identical.
21Speci¯cally, rewrite (11) as X(M ¡ nkmk) = M
2n
2
k, and sum over all alliances, k =




j. Simplifying and rearranging shows
that, in equilibrium, M = X(A ¡ 1)=F, which with (11) yields (12). From this solution,
it follows that mk > 0 for all k provided that F > (A ¡ 1)n
2
k holds for nk = n1.
22Ignoring integer problems in this symmetric case, A = N=n and F = nN.
10For any given alliance structure with mk > 0 for all k, the solution for
m(nk;S) reveals more generally that the equilibrium e®ort by the individual
members of alliance k in the inter-alliance con°ict is decreasing in the size
of the alliance, nk, as is the total e®ort by the alliance, nkm(nk;S). Not
surprisingly, then, the expected probability of winning the con°ict in stage
2, given by ¹k = [F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2
k]=F for A > 1, is also decreasing in the
alliance size, nk.
Using this expression for ¹k, (9), and (12), the payo® expected by each
individual member of alliance k at the end of stage one, ue(nk;S), can be
written as
ue(nk;S) = [F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2




for k = 1;2;:::;A, where as previously de¯ned, F ´
PA
j=1 n2
j and S =
fn1;n2 :::;nAg.
Not surprisingly then, given any alliance structure where mk > 0 for
k = 1;2;:::;A, individuals belonging to larger alliances expect a smaller
payo® than the payo® expected by those belonging to smaller alliances:
ue(n1;S) · ue(n2;S) · ¢¢¢ · ue(nA;S) (14)
where by assumption n1 ¸ n2 ¸ ::: ¸ nA. Of course, this ranking says
nothing about an individual's incentive to move from one alliance to another,
as it does not account for the e®ect of the hypothetical move on the e®orts
levels m by anyone in the stage-two con°ict or others' incentive to move in
response. Such incentives are considered more carefully in the analysis of
the stable formation of alliances below.
4.3 Expected gains from symmetric alliance formation
Before proceeding to that analysis, this subsection illustrates the gains
that individuals could expect under a symmetric, multi-member alliance
structure|i.e., where nk = n > 1 for all k: ^ S ´ fn;:::;ng. Using the
expression for an individual's expected payo® given in (13), the expected
gains under such an alliance structure relative to the outcome of individual
11con°ict can be written as
Ge(n) ´ ue(n; ^ S) ¡ ue(1; ¹ S) =
[(N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1)]X
N2n2 (15)
for n > 1, where as previously de¯ned ¹ S ´ f1;:::;1g.23 Some straightfor-
ward calculations based on this expression reveal the following:
Proposition 1 Under a symmetric alliance structure, with nk = n > 1 8
k = 1;2;:::;A, the gains expected by each individual, Ge(n), are
(a) strictly positive for n < N,
(b) decreasing in n, and
(c) equal to 0 for n = N.
The potential for greater expected payo®s suggests that the cost-saving ad-
vantage to appropriative/defense activities by an alliance, which has been
highlighted in the literature, might not be essential to the formation of
multi-member alliances. In the context of this simple model, the expected
gains come in the form of a reduction in the severity of con°ict over the
contestable resource X for 1 < n < N. No member of an alliance with
n > 1 fully internalizes the bene¯ts of her e®orts in that con°ict and so
naturally devotes less e®ort to it. In the symmetric outcome, everyone else
is doing just the same, so that the net e®ect on the winning probabilities in
the con°ict over X relative to the case of individual con°ict is zero. Thus, as
Proposition 1 indicates, there are potential gains under symmetric alliance
formation, with n < N.
The proposition also suggests, however, that the expected gains are lim-
ited. That is, though positive, the expected gains fall as n rises above 1.
As n increases and the second-stage con°ict between alliances weakens, the
third-stage con°ict over the distribution of the product within the alliance
intensi¯es; from an ex ante perspective, the increased costs associated with
the intensifying intra-alliance con°ict exceed the decreased costs associated
with the weakening inter-alliance con°ict. As n approaches N, the expected
gains from alliance formation go to zero. Of course, the actual outcome
23This function is also de¯ned for n = 1: G
e(1) = 0. From (13) under the assumption
that nk = n for all k, one can ¯nd u
e(n;S) = [N(n ¡ 1) + n]X=N
2n
2 . Similarly, u
e(1; ¹ S)
can be derived from (13) assuming nk = 1 for all k, which is equivalent to the expected
payo® that was derived earlier in section 3, ¹ u
e
1 = X=N
2 [see equation (5b)].
12under alliance formation with n = N will di®er from that under individual
con°ict by virtue of the di®erence in the nature of the con°ict in the two
outcomes. But, by assumption, the alliance has no means by which its mem-
bers can resolve con°ict without resorting to arms (s); therefore, shifting the
entire con°ict from one level over X to another over Y has no consequences
in terms of expected payo®s.24 Still, for n < N, Ge(n) > 0 holds, so that the
formation of symmetric alliances on net enhances expected welfare. As the
next section shows, the expected gain arising from the free-rider problem
alone is often su±cient to predict the emergence of alliances in equilibrium.
5 Endogenous alliance formation
Having characterized the allocation of resources in the second and third
stages of the game given the alliance structure, consider now the ¯rst stage
of the game|namely, the formation of alliances in equilibrium. In par-
ticular, de¯ning an equilibrium of the ¯rst stage as an outcome where no
individual can possibly increase her expected payo®, the analysis endoge-
nizes the alliance structure, S. When the number of individuals involved in
the second stage con°ict, N, is very small, it is possible that only individual
con°ict emerges in equilibrium. If, however, N is su±ciently large, multiple
con¯gurations of stable alliances could emerge in equilibrium.
5.1 Stability and equilibrium
To be sure, in the absence of any speci¯c bene¯ts from belonging to an
alliance (i.e., in terms of the con°ict or production technologies), there is a
strong incentive, given S, for each individual to break away from her own
alliance to form a stand-alone alliance. The logic here is quite simple. As
discussed earlier, each member's incentive to contribute to her own alliance's
collective e®ort in the second-stage con°ict is decreasing in the size of her
alliance. Hence, once having broken away from her alliance to form a stand-
alone alliance, given the membership of all other alliances and that of her
24If the members of an alliance could credibly agree to share the product equally without
arming (s = 0), the expected payo® under symmetric alliance formation, given in this case
by u
e(n;S) = [N(n¡1)+n]X=N
2n, would be increasing in n, so that the expected gains
under alliance formation, G
e(n) = (n ¡ 1)X=Nn, would also be increasing in n and be
strictly positive when evaluated at n = N.
13former alliance, any individual would have an increased incentive to put
forth some e®ort in the con°ict over X. At the same time, this deviation
would likely decrease the e®ort made by members of alliances not directly
a®ected by the deviation. By forming a stand-alone alliance, the individual
could, then, put herself in a very advantageous position to win the con°ict
over X and all for herself.
But, suppose that such a deviation must itself be stable or robust to
further deviations, which must be stable, and so on. Here the analysis fol-
lows the noncooperative theory of endogenous coalition structures which in
general imposes certain internal consistency requirements on possible devi-
ations.25 More speci¯cally, for the purposes of this analysis, we formulate
the following de¯nition of an equilibrium:
De¯nition 1 An alliance structure, S = fn1;n2;:::;nAg, is a Nash equi-
librium structure if (i) the payo® expected by each individual under that
structure is at least as large as that under individual con°ict and strictly
larger for at least one individual, and (ii) any deviation from that structure
by an individual eventually makes that individual worse o®.
Given this de¯nition, the evaluation of the potential gains from a given de-
viation must factor in the possibility of all subsequent deviations by others
and the resulting impact on expected payo®s. In envisioning individuals as
looking at the ultimate outcome of a deviation, the equilibrium re¯nement
employed here is most closely related to Chwe's (1994) notion of farsighted
stability. In the context of this model, although any individual would bene-
¯t, for example, by leaving her alliance to form a stand-alone alliance given
the membership of the other alliances and her former alliance, such de-
viations could ultimately trigger a reversion to individual con°ict, leaving
everyone, including the original deviator, worse o®. Accordingly, such devi-
ations themselves would be deemed unpro¯table and, thus, would not pose
a threat to the stability of the alliance structure under consideration.26 In
25See, for example, Bloch (1996), Chwe (1994), Ray and Vohra (1997,1999), and Yi
(1997).
26Of course, without having speci¯ed the dynamics that would take us from a potential
deviation to the outcome involving individual con°ict, invoking the notion of farsighted
stability here might seem ad hoc at best. However, the analysis in connection with Lemmas
1 and 2 in Appendix A.1 is suggestive. Moreover, this stability notion has much theoretical
appeal in its emphasis on internal consistency and on the importance of the eventual
outcome over the immediate outcome. On these points, see Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999).
14e®ect, invoking the notion of farsighted stability expands the opportuni-
ties for \cooperation" among individuals who would behave otherwise in a
noncooperative way.
For an open membership game where no consent is required to join an
already existing alliance, one must also verify that no individual has an
incentive to leave her alliance to join another. From the discussion above,
it should be clear that no individual would have an incentive to leave her
alliance to join an equal sized or larger alliance [see section 4.2]. However,
there may be an incentive to join a smaller alliance. In fact, when the size
of the largest alliance exceeds the smallest by 2 or more, each member of
the largest alliance, k = 1, has an incentive, holding the rest of the alliance
structure (including her own former alliance k = 1) ¯xed, to join one of the
smaller alliances. So that no such incentive exists, an equilibrium alliance
structure must be such that the largest alliance have, at most, one more
member than any other alliance: n1 · nj + 1 for any j = 2;:::;A.27
5.2 Equilibrium alliance structures
Based on the above discussion, the following characterizes multi-member
alliance formation in equilibrium:
Proposition 2 Fix the number of individuals, N, involved in the con°ict
over the contestable resource X.
(a) Suppose N can be decomposed into the product of two integers, A¤ > 1
and n¤ > 1. Then the symmetric multi-member alliance structure with
A¤ alliances each having n¤ members, ^ S¤ = fn¤;:::;n¤;g, is farsighted
stable and a Nash equilibrium structure.
(b) Given N, choose any A¤ 2 (1;N) and de¯ne a ´ N ¡ A¤n¤ where
a 2 [1;A¤). The asymmetric multi-member alliance structure, with
a alliances having n¤ + 1 members and A¤ ¡ a alliances having n¤
members, S¤ = fn¤+1;:::;n¤+1;n¤ :::;n¤g, is farsighted stable and
a Nash equilibrium structure provided n¤ satis¯es the inequality
[F ¡ (A¤ ¡ 1)(n¤ + 1)2][F ¡ (A¤ ¡ 1)(n¤ + 1)]
(n¤ + 1)2F2 >
1
(A¤n¤ + a)2
27See Lemma 3 in Appendix A.1.
15and, in the case that a = 1, an additional inequality
(A¤n¤2 ¡ A¤n¤ + 1)=(A¤n¤2 + 1)2n¤2 < 1=(A¤n¤ + 1)2;
where F = a(n¤ + 1)2 + (A¤ ¡ a)n¤2.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
Part (a) of the proposition establishes that, with the exception of the grand
alliance, all symmetric, multi-member alliance structures are stable.28 Hence,
the expected gains from the free-rider problem identi¯ed above are su±cient
to support the formation of multi-member alliances. Part (b) shows, how-
ever, that stability is not unique to symmetric alliance structures. Under
asymmetric alliance structures, although the expected gains are unevenly
distributed, everyone must be at least as well o® as they would be un-
der individual con°ict. This requirement, along with the requirement that
n1 · nj + 1 for any j = 2;:::;A, is embedded in the ¯rst inequality of the
proposition. The inequality ensures further that, for a = 2;:::;A¤¡1 given
N, a deviation by one individual originally belonging to a size{n+1 group to
form a stand-alone group would give at least one other individual the incen-
tive to do the same, thereby inducing a reversion to individual con°ict and
making the original deviation unpro¯table to all. Thus, the ¯rst inequality
alone is a su±cient condition for the farsighted stability of alliances with
a 2 (1;A). Matters may di®er, however, for alliances with a = 1. Neverthe-
less, the second inequality serves to rule out the pro¯tability of individual
deviations when a = 1.29
Given A¤ and for all a, the ¯rst equality imposes a lower bound on n.
This lower bound on n limits the degree of asymmetry between the size{n
groups and the size{n+1 groups so as not to give too much of an advantage
to the members of the smaller (size{n) groups in the contest for control of
X. For example, when n = 3 the advantage enjoyed by the smaller groups
28The failure of the grand alliance to emerge as an equilibrium structure is not un-
common in settings where there are positive externalities, especially when N is large [Yi
(1997), Yi and Shin (2000)]. The logic is essentially the same here, only more severe
because there is no possibility of con°ict management within the alliance. Allowing for
more peaceful exchange or interaction within the winning alliance, however, would imply
G
e(N) > 0, thereby making the grand alliance a possible outcome, though not necessarily
an e±cient one. [See Gar¯nkel (2004).]
29See Appendix A.2 for more details.
16over the larger groups (n + 1 = 4) is relatively more mild than when n = 2
(and n+1 = 3). Furthermore, increasing the number of larger sized groups
(n+1) relative to the number of the smaller sized groups (n) (or equivalently
when a is larger given A) means that members of the size{n + 1 groups are
put at a relatively smaller disadvantage. Thus, the lower bound on n can
be less severe for larger a. 30
To illustrate these tendencies, Tables 1 and 2 show the stable multi-
member alliance structure based on Proposition 2, by the equilibrium num-
ber of alliances, A¤.31 These tables show that, given N and A¤, there need
not exist any integer n > 1 that satis¯es the inequality in the proposition.
In fact, for N < 4, N = 5 and 7, no stable multi-member alliance structure
exists. However, as N increases, the conditions for stability, ruling out in-
dividual deviations only, weaken considerably. As shown in Table 1, there
exists at least one stable multi-member alliance structure for any N ¸ 8,
having A¤ = 2 alliances: for any even number N ¸ 8, both alliances have
n¤ = N=2 members; and, for any odd number N > 8, one alliance has
n¤ = (N ¡ 1)=2 members and the other has just one additional member,
n¤ + 1 = (N + 1)=2. Yet, as clearly shown in Table 2, other alliance struc-
tures are also possible. In general, for any given A¤ > 2, alliance structures
with fewer size{n+1 alliances (or smaller a) are more likely to be farsighted
stable when N is larger.32
With the multiplicity of possible structures, one might naturally wonder
how they would be ranked among the participants.33 For N < 9, where
30The second inequality shown in Proposition 2 similarly imposes a lower bound on n,
precisely when the constraint imposed by the ¯rst inequality is most binding (i.e., when
a = 1). Thus, it might not seem too surprising that, in this setting, the second inequality
is implied by the ¯rst. However, that is not a general result. The second inequality (given
a = 1) does becomes increasingly relevant over and above the ¯rst one once one allows for
more peaceful exchange within alliances [see Gar¯nkel (2004)].
31The minimum values of N, or equivalently the minimum values of n given A and
a 2 [1;A), for which a stable multi-member alliance structure exists were calculated using
Mathematica.
32Though not shown here, one can verify that, for all N ¸ 15, there exists yet another
alliance structure: for even N > 15, there is one stable structure with A
¤ = N=2 alliances,
each having 2 members; and, for odd N ¸ 15, there exists one stable structure with
A
¤ = (N + 1)=2 alliances, the ¯rst a = A
¤ ¡ 1 each having 2 members and the last
one having just one member. This is the least concentrated alliance structure that can
possibly emerge in equilibrium. For any structure with two or more alliances having just
one member cannot be stable [see Appendix A.1].
33One could apply the equilibrium re¯nement introduced by Bernheim, Peleg and Whin-
ston (1987), accounting for deviations of groups of individuals as well as for individual
17there are multiple equilibrium structures, they are all symmetric. Hence,
from Proposition 1, it is clear that everyone would prefer the structure hav-
ing the greatest number of alliances, A¤ = N=n¤ or equivalently the smallest
number of alliance members, n¤ > 1. In the case where both asymmetric
and symmetric alliances are possible, the ranking is not so obvious. Table
3 reports the expected payo®s per individual in each alliance, under the
alternative equilibrium alliance structures listed in Table 2, for N ¸ 9. It
also reports aggregate expected payo®s under each of those structures and
under individual con°ict. First, the table con¯rms that, under asymmetric
alliance structures, the bene¯ts of alliance formation relative to individ-
ual con°ict are distributed asymmetrically.34 When more than one stable
multi-member alliance structure exists for a given N, the payo®s expected
by members of the size{n alliances increase unambiguously as we move to
another asymmetric alliance structure with a larger number of alliances, A¤.
The same cannot be said for members of size{n+1 alliances. While in some
cases their expected payo®s increase as well, sometimes they fall but never
below what would be expected under individual con°ict. Furthermore, as
we move from an asymmetric alliance structure to a symmetric one with a
greater number of alliances (A), the payo®s expected by each member of
a size{n alliance fall while those expected by each member of a size{n + 1
alliance rise. Nonetheless, note that regardless of whether the alliance is
symmetric or asymmetric, aggregate expected payo®s are unambiguously
rising in the number of alliances (A) for any given N.35
These implications would appear to contrast sharply with those of Baik
and Lee's equilibrium analysis (2001) of strategic group formation with in-
deviations, and thereby sharpen the predictions of the analysis in terms of the number
of alliances and the size of alliances given N. But, there need not be any equilibrium at
all. [For an example see Yi and Shin (2000).] In any case, such an analysis is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
34Observe from both Tables 2 and 3, consistent with the previous discussion, that for any
given A
¤ and a, expected payo®s are more evenly distributed for larger N. Furthermore,
given N, they tend to be more evenly distributed when the number of size{n+1 alliances
(a) is larger relative to A
¤.
35A close examination of the table suggests that the bene¯ts of group-size asymmetry,
as identi¯ed by Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), can be realized only by increasing the number
of groups. That is to say, group-size asymmetry is not the sole source of the bene¯t. In
fact, Katz and Tokatlidu who ¯x the number of groups to 2 ¯nd that, the rate of rent
dissipation is non-monotonic in group size asymmetry. Hence, if one group is su±ciently
larger than the other, then increasing that group's membership any further has a negative
e®ect on aggregate expected payo®s.
18dividual rent-seeking. In that analysis, individuals win or lose the contest
on their own; if they win, they either share their prize with other members
of the group or receive an extra payo® from them. The particular sharing
rule is chosen by the groups' members before the con°ict. When more than
two (multi-member) strategic groups form in which case the groups must be
of a similar size as in the present analysis, within-group optimality dictates
that the winner take the entire prize for himself and a bonus from the other
members of his alliance. In this case, though better o® as a member of a
group, everyone is worse o® than they would be under individual con°ict,
and overall welfare is decreasing in the number of strategic groups. Such out-
comes, however, are dominated by the one where just one (multi-member)
strategic group forms and all other individuals participate in the con°ict on
their own.36 Within-group optimality requires, in this case, that the winner
shares his prize with the other members of his group, such that the free-rider
problem comes into play, as in the present analysis, to reduce the overall
level of con°ict. Hence, more in line with the predictions of the present
analysis, strategic group formation enhances everyone's expected payo®s.
That the equilibrium structure in this case looks very di®erent from that in
the present analysis can be attributed to Baik and Lee's assumption that
members within a group can somehow commit to a sharing rule|that is, to
allow for some form of cooperation.37
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the formation of stable alliances under rather
restrictive conditions. One central ¯nding is that increasing returns in nei-
ther the con°ict technology nor the production technology is essential for
the stability of alliances. Furthermore, there need not be any possibility for
peaceful exchange or interactions within the alliance. Instead, the e®ect of
36Note that, when N · 5, the grand coalition can emerge in equilibrium, in which
case the social waste associated with the con°ict is entirely eliminated. For N > 5, the
equilibrium size of the group is the smallest integer greater than N=2.
37Also see the recent analysis of Bloch, S¶ anchez-Page¶ es and Soubeyran (2002), who ¯nd
that the grand alliance emerges as the unique equilibrium of a sequential group formation
game. The strong tendency of grand alliance to emerge in equilibrium there, despite the
presence of positive externalities as in the present analysis, appears to be driven, in large
part, by the assumption that members of the alliance share the \prize" equally. That is
to say, the analysis abstracts from the di±culties of intra-alliance con°ict.
19alliances to reduce the degree of con°ict over the contestable resource alone
could be su±cient to support their stability in equilibrium.
This is not to say that these other factors related to the technology of
con°ict and production are irrelevant. Indeed, the analysis of this paper has
deliberately abstracted from many of the features of alliances that might
help to explain their emergence in more \civilized" settings. The central ob-
jective here was to study their formation in the most primitive environment
possible. Natural extensions of the present analysis, left for future research,
then, would be to consider these features.
Consider, for example, the process by which members within a group re-
solve a given sort of con°ict. It would seem reasonable to suppose, contrary
to the assumption of this paper, that the survival of groups over time re-
quires the creation and maintenance of \norms" and institutions that would
allow the alliance members to e®ect a more \peaceful" distribution of out-
put at a lower cost. More speci¯cally, within the context of this model,
the distribution of output should not depend entirely on force or security
measures taken by the groups' members to guard against one another. In a
modest extension of the present analysis, Gar¯nkel (2004) incorporates the
possibility of con°ict management, allowing for varying degrees of \coopera-
tion" within alliances.38 Given the number of individuals in competition for
the contestable resource, when mechanisms of con°ict management are rel-
atively more important in determining the distribution of the group's joint
product, a greater variety of group structures are possible in equilibrium.
When such mechanisms are su±ciently e®ective in con°ict resolution, larger
groups are more likely to emerge in equilibrium relative to what has been
suggested in the present analysis. However, provided that some within-group
con°ict remains despite whatever mechanisms of con°ict management are
in place, larger groups need not be better. That is to say, the grand alliance
generally is not the e±cient outcome.
A related extension would involve relaxing the assumption that indi-
viduals are ex ante identical. While heterogeneity within the population
(in terms of technologies and preferences) would seem more reasonable in
an analysis of group formation, most analyses assume ex ante symmetry.
Indeed, Skaperdas (1998) and Noh (2002) show just how complex the prob-
38Genicot and Skaperdas (2002) go somewhat deeper, modelling con°ict management
as an investment decision in a dynamic setting.
20lem quickly becomes in the case of only three individuals having di®erent
endowments. In the present analysis, without ex ante symmetry, it is no
longer possible to characterize an alliance structure by the number and size
of alliances alone. Nevertheless, such an extension seems worth pursuing,
as the heterogeneity of individuals raises some important and interesting is-
sues about the composition of alliances and about resolving con°icts therein,
provided that a stable structure exists at all.
Another interesting extension focuses on the technology of con°ict. In
abstracting from any sort of technological advantage that may exist for those
who join forces in an alliance [e.g., super-additivity, as in Skaperdas (1998)],
the analysis has emphasized the positive externalities of their formation.
Speci¯cally, in the context of the present framework, when a new alliance
forms or merges with another, those belonging to the new (larger) alliance
have a smaller incentive to compete for the contestable resource, implying
that everyone else enjoys an higher likelihood of success in the contest and
thus a higher expected payo®. As a result, con°ict over the contestable
resource falls.39 A con°ict technology exhibiting increasing returns and
negative externalities could yield very di®erent implications.40 In particular,
the e®ect of increasing returns on the incentive of individuals to contribute
to the collective e®ort could swamp the e®ects of the free-rider problem as
the size of the alliance rises, in which case group formation might aggravate
the con°ict.
Appendix
A.1. Preliminary results for stability and equilibrium
Lemma 1 Given an alliance structure with two or more stand-alone alliances S =
fn1;:::;nA¡2;1;1g, members i 2 Ak, where nk > 1, optimally choose not to
participate in the second-stage con°ict: m(nk;S) = 0.
Proof. By hypothesis, nA¡1 = nA = 1, implying that F =
PA¡2
k=1 n2
k + 2: Even
if all of the other (multi-member) alliances were of the same size, such that F
would be equal to the largest possible value of F = (A ¡ 2)n2
1 + 2, the inequality,
F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2
1 < 0, would hold, implying by (12) m(n1;S) = 0. Now, consider
39Of course, the new hypothetical alliance structure need not be stable.
40See Yi (1997) for a useful discussion of endogenous coalition formation games with
positive and negative externalities.
21alliance k = 2's decision to participate. Since alliance k = 1 is not active in the
con°ict over X, F =
PA¡2
k=2 n2
k +2:. As before, even when F is equal to the largest
possible value, F0 = (A¡3)n2
2 +2, the inequality, F0 ¡(A¡2)n2
2 < 0, would hold,
implying m(n2;S) = 0. With repeated applications of this logic, given S, one can
show sequentially that the remaining alliances k ¸ 3 for which nk ¸ 2 have no
incentive to participate in the con°ict over X.
Lemma 2 Stability of any given alliance structure, S = fn1;n2;:::;nAg, requires
mk > 0, for k = 1;2;:::;A.
Proof. Suppose there exists an alliance structure, S0, in which the members i of one
group k have no incentive to participate in the con°ict, m(nk;S0) = 0. By (12), this
group must be k = 1. Each member i 2 A1 obtains a payo® of just zero. Yet, given
the membership of all other groups, any i 2 A1 could secure a higher expected
payo® by competing for X on her own. Suppose that just one member i 2 A1
breaks away, yielding the new partition S00 = S0 rfn1g
S
fn1 ¡1;1g.41 Hence, the
original structure could not have been stable. Assuming that this deviation does
not a®ect the participation decision of the remaining members of alliance k = 1
(m(n1 ¡ 1;S00) = 0), the new structure is not stable either.42 Here, there are two
cases to consider:
Case 1. nk = 1, for k · A: If before the initial deviation, there had been one
or more stand-alone groups, by Lemma 1, that deviation would in turn push all
individuals remaining in a multi-member alliance (k for nk > 1) out of the con°ict
m(nk;S00) = 0.
Case 2. nA > 1. Each of the remaining members of alliance k = 1 could obtain a
higher payo® by competing for the contestable resource on her own as before. But
then, from Lemma 1, a move by any one of them would result in another structure,
S000, such that anyone remaining in a multi-member alliance (k for nk > 1) would
pull out of the con°ict m(nk;S000) = 0.
In either case, all those individuals i 2 Ak with nk > 1 and thus ue(nk;S) = 0
would have an incentive to deviate from the existing structure of alliances, S00 in
case 1 and S000 in case 2. In the very least, each could leave her alliance to form
a stand-alone alliance and, regardless of others' choices, expect a positive payo®
equal to ue(1; ~ S) = X= ~ N2 where ~ S consists of ~ N · N singletons and N ¡ ~ N ¸ 0
41Under S






k + 1. Then, from (13), u
e(1;S
00) = [F
00 ¡ (A ¡ 1)]
2X=F
002 > 0:
42Members of even smaller groups k ¸ 2 might pull out of the con°ict for an expected
payo® of zero as well. That would not change the basic logic of the argument to follow.
If instead m(n1 ¡ 1;S
00) > 0, the new structure S
00 would be stable and the proof would
be complete.
22individuals belonging to one or more multi-member alliances. Given a zero payo®
from non-participation, the incentive for any individual to move from her current
multi-member group to form another single-member alliance would remain strictly
positive.43
Lemma 3 When the size of the largest alliance exceeds the smallest by 2 or more,
any member of the largest has an incentive to join one of the smaller alliances,
holding the rest of the alliance structure (including the remainder of the largest
alliance) ¯xed: ue(n1;S) < ue(nj + 1;S0), where n1 > nj + 1 and S0 = S r
fn1;njg
S
fn1 ¡ 1;nj + 1g.
Proof. Using (13), we need only verify that the following inequality holds:
X[F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2
1][F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n1]
n2
1F2 <
X[F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(nj + 1)2][F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(nj + 1)]
(nj + 1)2F
02 (A.1)
for n1 > nj + 1, where F = n2
1 + n2




k. Assume that, under both alliance structures, mk > 0 for all k.44
Some tedious algebra shows that the inequality above will be satis¯ed if and only
if the following condition is satis¯ed:
[(nj + 1)2F
02 ¡ n2
1F2][(F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2
1)(F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n1)] <
n2
1F2£
[F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(nj + 1)2][F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(nj + 1)] ¡
[F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2
1][F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n1]
¤
: (A.2)
Note that if n1 = nj + 1, then F = F0 and the two sides of the expression are
identical and equal to 0. However, the assumption that n1 > nj + 1 implies F =
F0 + 2(n1 ¡ nj ¡ 1) > F0, making the left hand side of (A.2) negative. Thus, a
su±cient condition for (A.1) to hold for n1 > nj + 1 is that the right hand side of
(A.2) be positive. More tedious algebra shows that the right hand side of (A.2) is
positive for n1 > nj + 1 if and only if,
n2
1F2(n1 ¡ nj ¡ 1)
£
(A ¡ 3)[F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n2
1]+
[(A ¡ 1)(n1 + nj) + (A ¡ 3)][F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(nj + 1)]
¤
> 0: (A.3)
When A ¸ 3, the inequality clearly holds. When A = 2, there are just two alliances
and the term B vanishes from F and F0. In this case, more tedious algebra shows
43Given the focus on individual deviations in the analysis of equilibrium, it seems rea-
sonable to conjecture a tendency towards individual con°ict.
44Thus, F > (A ¡ 1)n
2
k and F
0 > (A ¡ 1)n
2
k for all k.




j)2(n1 ¡ nj ¡ 1)
£
(n1 + nj ¡ 1)[(n1 ¡ 1)2 + n2
j] + nj(n1 ¡ 1)
¤
; (A.4)
which is clearly positive. Therefore, in equilibrium, the di®erence in the sizes of
any two alliances cannot be greater than 1; it must be 0 or 1.
A.2. Proof of proposition 2
Part a: symmetric alliances. By Proposition 1, the expected payo®s under ^ S¤
for A¤ > 1 and n¤ ¸ 2 are strictly greater than those under individual con°ict,
¹ S. Hence, any deviation that triggered a reversion to individual con°ict would be
considered unpro¯table relative to ^ S¤. Now suppose an individual were to leave her
alliance to form a stand-alone alliance. Then there would be A¤+1 alliances: A¤¡1
alliances of size n¤, the deviator's former alliance of size n¤ ¡1, and the deviator's
new single-member alliance. As one can verify using (12), given the membership
of the deviator's former alliance (n¤ ¡1 ¸ 1), such a deviation from the symmetric
structure would push the members of the other original A¤ ¡ 1 alliances to the
corner m = 0, implying a reversion to individual con°ict by Lemma 2. Finally,
since alliances are all of the same size and n¤ ¸ 2 under ^ S¤, no individual would
have an incentive to leave her alliance to join another [Lemma 3].
Part b: asymmetric alliances. By construction, under S¤ each alliance is of size n or
n + 1, such that no individual has an incentive to join another alliance [Lemma 3].
The inequality ensures, in addition, that the expected payo® under that structure
for any member belonging to a size{n+1 alliance is greater than that under individ-
ual con°ict. Then, by (14), members of all alliances would consider any deviation
which triggered a reversion to individual con°ict to be unpro¯table relative to S¤.
Thus, to verify that no individual (belonging to an n + 1-member group) would
have an incentive to form a group on her own, it is only necessary to show that
the payo®s expected by another under that hypothetical deviation are less than
that under individual con°ict. For a = 2;:::;A¤ ¡ 1 given N, such a deviation
would result in a new partition with A + 1 groups: A¤ ¡ a + 1 groups with n¤
members, a¡1 groups with n+1 members and 1 stand-alone group, implying that
F ¡ A(n + 1)2 = ¡(A ¡ a)(1 + 2n) ¡ 2n < 0. Thus, from (12), this individual
deviation would push the members of the remaining a¡1 groups with n+1 mem-
bers to the corner (m = 0) for a zero payo®. By the reasoning of Lemma 2, such
a deviation would trigger a reversion to individual con°ict, and would therefore be
deemed unpro¯table. For a = 1, when an individual from the single group of size
n+1 forms a group on her own, a new structure, again with A+1 groups, emerges:
24A groups of size n and one stand-alone group. In this case, such a deviation would
not push anyone away from an interior optimum. However, as long as the second
inequality shown in the proposition holds, everyone but the original deviator would
be worse o® than if there were no groups at all. Then, by the reasoning applied
earlier, the initial deviation would induce a reversion to individual con°ict, mak-
ing everyone including the original deviator worse o® relative to the initial alliance
structure under consideration.
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27Table 1. Equilibrium alliance structures
Number of a A¤ ¡ a min n¤
Alliances
A¤ = 2 for N = 2n ¸ 4 0 2 2
for N = 2n + 1 ¸ 9 1 1 4
A¤ = 3 for N = 3n ¸ 6 0 3 2
for N = 3n + 1 ¸ 16 1 2 5
for N = 3n + 2 ¸ 11 2 1 3
A¤ = 4 for N = 4n ¸ 8 0 4 2
for N = 4n + 1 ¸ 29 1 3 7
for N = 4n + 2 ¸ 22 2 2 5
for N = 4n + 3 ¸ 11 3 1 2
A¤ = 5 for N = 5n ¸ 10 0 5 2
for N = 5n + 1 ¸ 46 1 4 9
for N = 5n + 2 ¸ 37 2 3 7
for N = 5n + 3 ¸ 23 3 2 4
for N = 5n + 4 ¸ 14 4 1 2
A¤ = 6 for N = 6n ¸ 12 0 6 2
for N = 6n + 1 ¸ 67 1 5 11
for N = 6n + 2 ¸ 56 2 4 9
for N = 6n + 3 ¸ 39 3 3 6
for N = 6n + 4 ¸ 28 4 2 4
for N = 6n + 5 ¸ 17 5 1 2
A¤ = 7 for N = 7n ¸ 14 0 7 2
for N = 7n + 1 ¸ 92 1 6 13
for N = 7n + 2 ¸ 79 2 5 11
for N = 7n + 3 ¸ 66 3 4 9
for N = 7n + 4 ¸ 46 4 3 6
for N = 7n + 5 ¸ 33 5 2 4
for N = 7n + 6 ¸ 20 6 1 2
A¤ = 8 for N = 8n ¸ 16 0 8 2
for N = 8n + 1 ¸ 121 1 7 15
for N = 8n + 2 ¸ 106 2 6 13
for N = 8n + 3 ¸ 91 3 5 11
for N = 8n + 4 ¸ 68 4 4 9
for N = 8n + 5 ¸ 53 5 3 6
for N = 8n + 6 ¸ 38 6 2 4
for N = 8n + 7 ¸ 15 7 1 1
Notes: a denotes the number of alliances with n¤ +1 members; A¤ ¡a denotes
the remaining number of alliances with n¤ members. N denotes the total








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 3. Expected payo®s under alternative equilibrium structures
N A: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 N
9 n 3.44 2.88 1.23
n + 1 1.37 2.88 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 1.23
N 20.61 25.93 11.11
10 n 1.80 3.00 1.00
n + 1 1.80 ¢ ¢ 3.00 ¢ ¢ ¢ 1.00
N 18.00 30.00 10.00
11 n 2.17 5.32 12.36 0.83
n + 1 1.03 1.10 1.02 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.83
N 16.99 24.80 33.87 9.09
12 n 1.27 1.74 2.08 2.43 0.69
n + 1 1.27 1.74 2.08 ¢ 2.43 ¢ ¢ 0.69
N 15.28 20.83 25.00 29.17 8.33
13 n 1.49 0.59
n + 1 0.79 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.59
N 14.48 7.69
14 n 0.95 2.83 12.00 2.04 0.51
n + 1 0.95 0.82 ¢ 0.78 ¢ 2.04 ¢ 0.51
N 13.27 19.55 33.33 28.57 7.14
15 n 1.08 1.16 4.92 1.63 57.55 0.44
n + 1 0.63 1.16 0.78 1.63 ¢ ¢ 0.45 0.44
N 12.63 17.33 24.12 24.44 63.80 6.67
16 n 0.73 1.48 1.27 1.76 0.39
n + 1 0.73 0.39 1.27 ¢ ¢ ¢ 1.76 0.39
N 11.72 17.13 20.31 28.13 6.25
17 n 0.82 1.74 11.78 0.35
n + 1 0.51 0.63 ¢ ¢ 0.63 ¢ ¢ 0.35
N 11.20 16.22 32.99 5.88
18 n 0.58 0.82 1.34 0.31
n + 1 0.58 0.82 ¢ ¢ 1.34 ¢ ¢ 0.31
N 10.49 14.81 24.07 5.56
19 n 0.65 1.01 2.56 4.71 0.28
n + 1 0.42 0.34 0.59 0.60 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.28
N 10.06 14.56 19.07 23.74 5.26
See the notes at the bottom of the table which is continued on the next page.
30Table 3. Expected payo®s ::: continued
N A: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 N
20 n 0.47 1.17 0.85 1.00 11.62 0.25
n + 1 0.47 0.49 0.85 1.00 ¢ 0.53 ¢ 0.25
N 9.50 13.89 17.00 20.00 32.76 5.00
21 n 0.52 0.62 1.13 0.23
n + 1 0.36 0.62 ¢ ¢ ¢ 1.13 ¢ 0.23
N 9.14 12.93 23.81 4.76
22 n 0.39 0.74 1.35 0.21
n + 1 0.39 0.30 0.27 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.21
N 8.68 12.68 16.78 4.55
23 n 0.43 0.84 1.55 2.14 4.57 11.51 0.19
n + 1 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.21 0.49 ¢ 0.46 0.19
N 8.37 12.17 15.86 20.28 23.50 32.59 4.35
24 n 0.33 0.48 0.61 2.42 0.82 0.98 0.17
n + 1 0.33 0.48 0.61 0.46 0.82 ¢ 0.98 0.17
N 7.99 11.46 14.58 18.79 19.79 23.61 4.17
25 n 0.36 0.56 0.67 0.16
n + 1 0.26 0.25 ¢ 0.67 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.16
N 7.72 11.23 16.80 4.00
26 n 0.28 0.63 0.91 0.15
n + 1 0.28 0.32 0.24 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.15
N 7.40 10.83 14.26 3.85
27 n 0.31 0.38 1.03 4.47 0.14
n + 1 0.23 0.38 0.36 ¢ ¢ 0.41 ¢ 0.14
N 7.16 10.29 13.62 23.33 3.70
28 n 0.25 0.44 0.46 1.28 0.70 0.13
n + 1 0.25 0.22 0.46 0.21 ¢ 0.70 ¢ 0.13
N 6.89 10.08 12.76 16.58 19.64 3.57
29 n 0.26 0.49 0.56 1.44 2.32 0.12
n + 1 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.35 0.37 ¢ ¢ 0.12
N 6.68 9.76 12.70 15.66 18.62 3.45
Notes: The ¯rst 7 columns (A = 2¡8) report the expected payo®s under the equilibrium
multi-member alliance structures reported in Table 2. The last column (A = N) reports
the analogous expected payo®s under individual con°ict. The entries for n and n + 1
report the payo®s expected by each member of groups having respectively n and n + 1
members. For symmetric groups, the same payo® is indicated for both groups. The
entry for N reports the expected payo®s summed over all individuals. [The individual
payo®s might not sum to the aggregate payo®s due to rounding.] These calculations
assume that X = 100.
31